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1 Introduction
The case-based decision theory was proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) as an alternative
theory for decision making under uncertainty. It models decisions in situations of structural
ignorance, in which neither states of the world, nor their probabilities can be derived from the
description of the problem. A decision-maker can, therefore, only learn from experience, by
evaluating an act based on its past performance in similar circumstances.
This behavior deviates significantly from the one of a Bayesian expected utility maximizer.
Nevertheless, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) show that a case-based decision-maker learns to
choose the optimal (expected utility maximizing) act if the same problem is repeated an infinite
number of times. This result relies on a rule for adapting the aspiration level that combines
’’realism’’, i.e. updating the aspiration level towards the highest average payoff achieved, with
’’ambitiousness’’, i.e. updating the aspiration level upwards on an infinite but sparse subset of
periods.
However, the result Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) depends on the assumption of a specific
similarity function: two acts are similar if and only if they are identical.
In this note, I explore whether case-based decisions lead to expected utility maximization in the
limit if more general similarity functions are considered. I assume that the set of acts is the one-
dimensional simplex and define the similarity function as decreasing in the Euclidean distance.
Following results obtain:
1. Similarity functions which are convex over some range lead a case-based decision-maker
to behave as if she were Bayesian;
2. For concave similarity functions, a case-based decision-maker either chooses the better
of the two corner acts 0 and 1 or switches constantly between these two acts. She may,
therefore, fail to behave as a Bayesian.
2 The Model
I use the model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996). A decision-maker faces an identical decision
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problem p in each period t = 1, 2.... A ≡ [0; 1] denotes the set of available acts. The utility
resulting from the choice of a ∈ A is an i.i.d. random variable Ua with a continuous distribution
function (Πa)a∈A. The distributions (Πa)a∈A have finite expectations µa, finite variance σa and
bounded and convex supports∆a.
The decision-maker’s perception of similarity is described by a function s : A×A→ [0; 1]:
s (a; a) = 1
s (a; a) = s (a; a)
s (0; 1) = 0.
s depends only on the distance between a and a.
The memory of the decision-maker is represented by a set of cases. A case is a triple of a
problem encountered, an act chosen and a utility realization achieved. Since the problem is
identical in each period of time, a case is characterized by an act and a utility realization. As in
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996), the memoryMt contains only cases actually encountered by the
decision-maker until period t:
Mt = ((aτ ;uτ ))τ=1,2...t .
The aspiration level of the decision-maker in period t is u¯t.
The case-based decision-rule prescribes choosing the act with maximal cumulative utility in
each period of time. The cumulative utility of an act a at time t is given by:
Ut (a) =
t[
τ=1
s (a; aτ) (uτ − u¯t) .
The set of all possible decisions paths that can be observed can be written as
S0 =
q
ω = (at;ut; u¯t)t=1,2... | at ∈ A, ut ∈ ∆, u¯t ∈ R
r
,
where ∆ = ∪a∈A∆a denotes the set of possible utility realizations. Let S1 be the set of those
paths on which the decision-maker chooses argmaxa∈A Ut (a) in each period:
S1 =

ω ∈ S0 | at = argmax
a∈A
Ut (a) for all t = 1, 2...

.
As well as at, ut and u¯t all variables introduced below depend on the path ω. I neglect this
dependence in the notation for simplicity of exposition.
Ct (a) denotes the set of periods preceding t in which a has been chosen:
Ct (a) = {τ < t | aτ = a}
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Let
Xt (a) =
[
τ∈Ct(a)
uτ
|Ct (a)|
denote the average utility obtained by choosing a until period t if |Ct (a)| > 0. Xt =: maxa∈AXt (a)
stays for the maximal achieved average utility until time t.
The two adaptation rules proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) are:
u¯1 = u¯
u¯t = βu¯t−1 + (1− β)Xt for t ≥ 2
(1)
and
u¯1 = u¯
u¯t = βu¯t−1 + (1− β)Xt for t ≥ 2, t /∈ N
u¯t = Xt + h for t ≥ 2, t ∈ N ,
(2)
where N ⊂ N is a sparse set, β ∈ (0; 1) describes the speed of updating of the aspiration level
and h > 0 is a constant by which the aspiration level is increased in a period t ∈ N .
Finally, denote by S and S the set of paths, on which the case-based rule is applied in combi-
nation with (1) and (2), respectively:
S =

ω ∈ S1 | u¯1 = u¯1u¯t = βu¯t−1 + (1− β)Xt for t ≥ 2

S =
⎧
⎨
⎩ω ∈ S1 |
u¯1 = u¯1
u¯t = βu¯t−1 + (1− β)Xt for t ≥ 2, t /∈ N
u¯t = Xt + h for t ≥ 2, t ∈ N ,
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
Let P and P  be probability measures on S and on S, respectively which are consistent with
(Πa)a∈A, as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996, p.11).
Denote by
π (a) = lim
t→∞
|Ct (a)|
t
the frequency with which a is chosen, if the limit on the right hand side exists. Usually, this
frequency will be path-dependent.
Optimal behavior in the limit means that
π

argmax
a∈A
µa

= 1
almost surely holds. For A finite and a similarity function:
s (a; a) = 1, if a = a (3)
s (a; a) = 0, else,
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) show that (2) implies optimal behavior in the above sense. For
4
(1), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) demonstrate that for each ε > 0, there is a u¯0, so that for all
u¯ ≥ u¯0, expected utility maximization obtains with probability of at least (1− ε).
The following two sections analyze the implications of a non-degenerate similarity function on
learning.
3 Learning with a Concave Similarity Function
Assumption 1
s (a; a) = f (na− an) ,
with f  < 0 and f  < 0, as illustrated in figure 1.
?
?
aa
s(a; a)
1 ...................................................................................
1
....................................
s(a; a)
Figure 1
The concavity of s implies that the greater the distance of two acts a and a from the reference
act a, themore the decision-maker distinguishes between a and awith respect to their similarity
to a.
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Let a1 = a¯ and let u1 (a¯) denote the utility realization of portfolio a¯ in period 1.
Proposition 1 Let assumption 1 hold. Define S˜ as
S˜ = {ω ∈ S | u1 (a¯) ≤ max {µ0;µ1}} .
For each ε > 0 there exists a u¯0 such that for any u¯1 > u¯0:
P

ω ∈ S | ∃π

arg max
a∈{0;1}
µa

= 1

≥ (1− ε)P

S˜

P
⎧
⎨
⎩ω ∈ S |
for each a ∈ A ∃π (a) such that
π(0)
π(1) =
µ1−u1(a¯)
µ0−u1(a¯)
and
π (a) = 0 for a /∈ {0; 1}
⎫
⎬
⎭ = 1− P

S˜

,
holds.
Hence, for concave similarity functions optimal behavior fails to emerge under rule (1). Only the
corner acts 1 and 0 are chosen infinitely often. On S˜, the better of these two acts is satisfactory
in the limit and is chosen with frequency 1 with arbitrarily high probability. On S\S˜, the limit
aspiration level exceeds themean utilities of 1 and 0. Both acts are therefore chosenwith positive
frequencies.
Proposition 2 Let assumption 1 hold. Assume that either
u¯ > max
u∈∆a¯
u
or 1 ∈ N . Define S˜ as
S˜ = {ω ∈ S | u1 (a) ≤ max {µ0;µ1}} .
Then:
P

ω ∈ S | ∃π

arg max
a∈{0;1}
µa

= 1

= P

S˜

P
⎧
⎨
⎩ω ∈ S
 |
for each a ∈ A ∃π (a) such that
π(0)
π(1) =
µ1−u1(a¯)
µ0−u1(a¯)
and
π (a) = 0 for a /∈ {0; 1}
⎫
⎬
⎭ = 1− P

S˜

,
holds.
Two effects prevent efficient learning. First, the strict monotonicity of the similarity function
and the initially high aspiration level imply that a¯ is abandoned in the second period. Since s is
concave, only corner acts are chosen after t = 2.
Second, although a¯ is never chosen again, its initial realization influences the evolution of the
aspiration level. Especially, if u1 (a¯) > max {µ0;µ1},
lim
t→∞
u¯t = u1 (a¯) > max {µ0;µ1}
and both a = 0 and a = 1 seem unsatisfactory in the limit.
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4 Introducing Convexities into the Similarity Function
The proof of proposition 1 heavily relies on the concavity of the similarity function. I, therefore,
explore how results change if the similarity function is convex over some range of values.
Assumption 2 Let
s (a; a) = f (na− an) ,
with f  < 0, f  < 0 for na− an ≤ 1
l
and some l > 1. Let
f (na− an) = 0,
for na− an ≥ 1
l
.
A convex similarity function implies that the greater the distance of two acts a and a from the
referential act a, the less is the decision-maker able to distinguish between a and a with respect
to their similarity to a. When l → ∞, s approaches the similarity function (3) considered by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996).
Assumption 3 Let a1 = 0 and let
at = arg min
a∈argmaxUt(a)
arg maxa∈[0;1] {Ut (a)}− at−1


.
Assumption 3 says that when indifferent among several acts, the decision-maker chooses the act
closest to the act chosen last.
Figure 2 illustrates assumptions 2 and 3.
The set of paths consistent with (2) and assumptions 2 and 3 is denoted by:
S =

ω ∈ S | a1 = 0
at = argmina∈argmaxUt(a)
(argmaxa∈[0;1] {Ut (a)}− at−1
)

.
Proposition 3 For all u¯1 ∈ R and all β ∈ (0; 1),
P

ω ∈ S | ∃π

argmax
a

µa | a ∈

0;
1
l
;
2
l
...
l − 1
l
; 1

= 1

= 1.
Introducing convexities into the similarity function obviously improves the limit choice. Note,
however that although
lim
l→∞

argmax
a

µa | a ∈

0;
1
l
;
2
l
...
l − 1
l
; 1

= arg max
a∈[0;1]
µa,
optimal learning cannot obtain because A is uncountable. However, for sufficiently large l, the
investor’s limit choice approximates expected utility maximization with an arbitrary degree of
accuracy.
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5 Conclusion
It is beyond the scope of this note to explore whether similarity is better represented by a convex
or concave function. Intuitively, it seems that similarity perceptions are more vague for distant
objects, hence that convexity is a more appropriate assumption. If convexity of the similarity
function is indeed the more relevant case, then my findings would clearly support Gilboa and
Schmeidler’s claim that case-based decision-makers behave optimally in the limit.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Denote
Vt (a) =:
[
τ∈Ct(a)
[uτ (a)− u¯t] ,
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with
[
τ∈Ct(a)
[uτ (a)− u¯t] = 0, if Ct (a) = ∅.
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, it is shown that a2 ∈ {0; 1}. Second, it is demonstrated
that at ∈ {0; 1} for all t ≥ 2. In step 3, applying theorem 1 of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996)
shows that optimal behavior obtains on S˜ and theorem 1 of Gilboa and Pazgal (2001) allows to
derive the result on S\S˜.
Step 1
In t = 2,
U2 (a¯) = V2 (a¯) = u1 (a¯)− βu¯1 − (1− β)u1 (a¯) = β [u1 (a¯)− u¯1] < 0,
whereas:
U2 (a) = V2 (a¯) s (a; a¯) < 0.
Since s (a; a¯) is strictly decreasing,
arg max
a∈[0;1]
U2 (a) ∈ {0; 1} .
Remark 1 Let Cτ (a) ≥ 1. Let u¯τ > Xτ (a) and aτ 9= a.
u¯τ+1 = βXτ+1 + (1− β) u¯τ ≥ βXτ (a) + (1− β) u¯τ
and u¯τ > Xτ (a) imply
u¯τ+1 > Xτ (a) , or
Vt (a) < 0
for each t ≥ τ such that ak 9= a¯ for all τ ≤ k < t.
Step 2
Assume w.l.g. that a2 = 0, i.e.
min
a∈[0;1]
s (a; a¯) = 0
If aτ = 0 for all t > τ ≥ 2,
Ut (a) = s (a; a¯)Vt (a¯) + s (a; 0)Vt (0)
holds. If Vt (0) ≥ 0, at = 0, since
Ut (a) = s (a; a¯)Vt (a¯) + s (a; 0)Vt (0) ≤
≤ s (0; a¯)Vt (a¯) + Vt (0) = Ut (0) .
If Vt (0) < 0,
Ut (a) = s (a; a¯)Vt (a¯) + s (a; 0)Vt (0)
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is convex, since Vt (a¯) < 0, Vt (0) < 0 and s is concave. Therefore,
arg max
a∈[0;1]
Ut (a) ∈ {0; 1} .
Let at¯ = 1. t¯ is a.s. finite. If aτ = 1 for all t > τ ≥ t¯,
Ut (a) = s (a; a¯)Vt (a¯) + s (a; 0)Vt (0) + s (a; 1)Vt (1) .
Vt¯ (0) < 0 implies Vt (0) < 0, see remark 1.
If Vt (1) ≤ 0 holds, Ut (a) is convex and at ∈ {0; 1}.
Let Vt (1) > 0. Since
Vt (1) > 0 > max {Vt (a¯) ;Vt (0)} ,
Xt = Xt (1). Let
t˜ = max {t¯; τ < t | Vτ (1) ≤ 0, aτ = 1, Vτ+1 (1) > 0} . (4)
Lemma 4 u¯t > u¯t˜.
Proof of lemma 4:
Since Vt˜ (1) ≤ 0, Xt˜ (1)− u¯t˜ ≤ 0 holds. Vt˜+1 (1) > 0 implies
Xt˜+1 (1)− u¯t˜+1 > 0 > max {Xt˜+1 (0)− u¯t˜+1;Xt˜+1 (a¯)− u¯t˜+1} .
Hence,Xt˜+1 = Xt˜+1 (1) and
u¯t˜+1 = βu¯t˜ + (1− β)Xt˜+1 (1) .
SinceXt˜+1 (1)− u¯t˜+1 > 0,
u¯t˜+1 > u¯t˜
follows.
At t˜+ 2, Vt˜+2 (1) > 0 holds, hence Xt˜+2 =Xt˜+2 (1) > u¯t˜+2 and
u¯t˜+2 = βu¯t˜+1 + (1− β)Xt˜+2 (1) .
Therefore,
u¯t˜+2 > u¯t˜+1.
Hence, by induction, u¯t > u¯t˜.?
At t,
Ut (1) = s (1; a¯)Vt (a¯) + Vt (1) .
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Hence, at = 1 if
s (1; a¯)Vt (a¯) + Vt (1) ≥ s (a; a¯)Vt (a¯) + s (a; 0)Vt (0) + s (a; 1)Vt (1) (5)
for all a ∈ [0; 1]. Rewrite (5) as
Vt (1) (1− s (a; 1))− s (a; 0)Vt (0) + [s (1; a¯)− s (a; a¯)]Vt (a¯) ≥ 0
Vt (1) (1− s (a; 1))− s (a; 0) (t¯ − 2) [Xt˜ (0)− u¯t˜] + [s (1; a¯)− s (a; a¯)] [u1 (a¯)− u¯t˜]
+ [u¯t − u¯t˜] [s (a; 0) (t¯ − 2)− s (1; a¯) + s (a; a¯)] ≥ 0.
Since s (·; ·) is concave,
arg min
a∈[0;1]
s (a; 0) (t¯ − 2) + s (a; a¯) ∈ {0; 1} .
s (1; 0) (t¯ − 2) + s (1; a¯) = s (1; a¯)
and
s (0; 0) (t¯ − 2) + s (0; a¯) = (t¯ − 2) + s (0; a¯) > 1 + s (0; a¯) > s (1; a¯) .
It follows that:
min
a∈[0;1]
[u¯t − u¯t˜] [s (a; 0) (t¯ − 2)− s (1; a¯) + s (a; a¯)] = 0.
Therefore,
Ut (1)− Ut (a) ≥ Vt (1) (1− s (1; a))− s (a; 0)Vt˜ (0) + [s (1; a¯)− s (a; a¯)]Vt˜ (a¯)
> Vt˜ (1) (1− s (a; 1))− s (a; 0)Vt˜ (0) + [s (1; a¯)− s (a; a¯)]Vt˜ (a¯)
= Ut˜ (1)− Ut˜ (a) ≥ 0
for each a ∈ [0; 1], since Vt˜ (1) ≤ 0 and at˜ = 1. Hence, at = 1.
Analogously, if at−1 = 0 and Vt (0) < 0, at ∈ {0; 1}. For Vt (0) ≥ 0,
Ut (0)− Ut (a) = Vt (0) (1− s (a; 0))− s (a; 1)Vt (1) + [s (0; a¯)− s (a; a¯)]Vt (a¯) ≥ 0,
since Vt (0) (1− s (a; 0)) ≥ 0, Vt (1) < 0, Vt (a¯) < 0 and s (0; a¯)−s (a; a¯) < 0 for all a ∈ [0; 1].
Hence, at = 0.
Reasoning by induction implies
P {ω ∈ S | at ∈ {0; 1} for each t > 1} = 1. (6)
Step 3
On S˜, theorem 1 of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) applies. Hence, there exists a u¯0 such that
for each u¯1 ≥ u¯0:
P

ω ∈ S | ∃π

arg max
a∈{0;1}
µa

= 1

≥ (1− ε)P

S˜

.
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If u1 (a¯) > max {µ1;µ0}, limt→∞ u¯t = u1 (a¯) almost surely. Hence, on almost each ω, there is
a T (ω) such that
u¯t > max {µ1;µ0}+ ξ
for each t > T (ω). Therefore, a = 0 and a = 1 are almost surely chosen infinitely often.
Theorem 1 in Gilboa and Pazgal (2001) implies:
π (0)
π (1)
=
µ1 − u1 (a¯)
µ0 − u1 (a¯)
S\S˜-a.s.. By (6), π (a) = 0 for a /∈ {0; 1}.?
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in three steps. Step 1 demonstrates that a2 ∈ {0; 1}. Step 2 shows that
at ∈ {0; 1} for t ≥ 2. Step 3 uses theorem 2 of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) and theorem 1 of
Gilboa and Pazgal (2001) to derive the result.
Step 1
At t = 2, either
U2 (a¯) = V2 (a¯) = u1 (a¯)− βu¯1 − (1− β)u1 (a¯) = β [u1 (a¯)− u¯1] < 0
or
U2 (a¯) = V2 (a¯) = u1 (a¯)−X2 − h = −h < 0
holds. The strict monotonicity of s implies at ∈ {0; 1}.
Remark 2 Remark 1 applies, since for (τ + 1) /∈ N , u¯τ+1 is adapted as under (1), whereas
for 0 ∈ N ,
u¯τ+1 = Xτ+1 + h > Xτ+1 ≥ Xτ+1 (a)
holds.
Step 2
As in the proof of proposition 1, it can be shown that
P {ω ∈ S1 | at ∈ {0; 1} for each t > 1} = 1.
This follows from remark 2 and from the definition of t˜ in (4). Note that (4) implies
t˜+ 1, ...t¯ /∈ N ,
since for t ∈ N , Vt (at−1) < 0.
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Step 3
On S˜1, theorem 2 of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) applies. Therefore,
π

arg max
a∈{0;1}
µa

= 1
almost surely obtains.
On S1\S˜1, u¯t → u1 (a¯). Hence, a.s. there is a period T (ω) such that
|u¯t − u1 (a¯)| < ζ
for each t > T (ω) except on a sparse set of periods for an arbitrary ζ . Hence, the acts 0 and 1
are chosen an infinite number of times. But since now
lim
t→∞
u¯t = u1 (a¯) > max {µ0;µ1} ,
theorem 1 of Gilboa and Pazgal (2001) implies:
π (0)
π (1)
=
µ1 − u1 (a¯)
µ0 − u1 (a¯)
.?
Proof of Proposition 3
Rule (2) implies
Ut¯ (0) = Vt¯ (0) < 0
for some finite t¯ > 0. By assumption 2,
Ut¯ (a) = 0 > Ut¯ (a
) for all a ≥ 1
l
and a <
1
l
.
Hence, at¯+1 = 1l by assumption 3. Remark 2 applies here as well. Hence, for a finite tˆ > t¯,
Utˆ

1
l

< 0
and
Utˆ (a) = 0 > Utˆ (a
) for all a ≥ 2
l
and a <
2
l
from assumption 2. Hence, atˆ = 2l , etc.
Once Ct
 
k
l

≥ 1 obtains for all k = 0...l,
Ut (a) =
l[
i=0
Vt

i
l

s

a;
i
l

= Vt

k
l

s

a;
k
l

+ Vt

k − 1
l

s

a;
k − 1
l

,
for a ∈

k−1
l
; k
l

. According to remark 2, Vt
 
k
l

> 0 can hold for at most one k ∈ {0; ...l}. If
Vt

k
l

> 0,
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then at = at−1 = kl , since
Vt

k
l

> Vt

k
l

s

a;
k
l

+ Vt

k − 1
l

s

a;
k − 1
l

for all a ∈

k−1
l
; k
l

and
Vt

k
l

> 0 ≥ Vt

k
l

s

a;
k
l

+ Vt

k − 1
l

s

a;
k − 1
l

for all k 9= k and all a ∈ [0; 1] hold. If
max

Vt

k
l

;Vt

k − 1
l

< 0,
then Ut (a) is convex for a ∈

k−1
l
; k
l

. Hence,
arg max
a∈[k−1l ;
k
l ]
Ut (a) ∈

k
l
;
k − 1
l

and
argmax
a∈A
Ut (a) ∈

0;
1
l
; ...
k
l
; ...1

for every t.
The result then follows from theorem 2 of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996).?
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